Posted on by Stephen Tuck

Vesely v Armslist LLC (2013) H&FLR 2014-10

Vesely v Armslist LLC (2013) H&FLR 2014-10

United States District Court (N.D. Illinois)

29 July 2013

Coram: Norgle J

Appearing for the Plaintiff: Jonathan Lowy and Lindsey Merikas (Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence) and Jay Dobrutsky and Alexander Marks (Burke, Warren, MacKay & Serritella)
Appearing for the Defendant: Andrew Lothson and James Vogts (Swanson Martin & Bell LLP)

Catchwords: Illinois – firearm – illegally purchased – advertisement – website – wrongful death – negligence – public policy – duty – foreseeability

Facts: On 13 April 2011 Demetry Smirnov (a resident of Canada) killed Jitka Vesely in Illinois using a firearm he had purchased illegally from a third party in Washington State. The firearm had been advertised for sale on http://www.armslist.com, a website operated by the defendant (a company registered in Oklahoma).

The plaintiff sought compensation from the defendant for wrongful death on the basis of negligence, as well as for the deceased’s pain and suffering pre-death, and for the deceased’s family’s costs associated with his funeral and burial. In particular, it was alleged that public policy required the court to recognise that the defendant owed a duty to the public at large, and that the defendant had negligently designed its website so that firearms could be sold illegally to dangerous people..

The defendant sought to have the claim dismissed on the grounds that it did not owe any duty to the deceased.

Held: dismissing the claim –

(1) A claim under Illinois’ Wrongful death Act requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that (a) the defendant owed a duty to the deceased; (b) that the duty was breached; (c) that the breach proximately caused the death; and (d) financial loss was caused to certain categories of people identified in the act.

Lough v BNSF Railway Co., 988 NE.2d 1090 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013), applied.

(2) In considering whether public policy requires a duty to exist a court should consider the reasonable foreseeability and likelihood of the injury, the burden to be imposed in preventing it and the consequences of so burdening a defendant.

Chicago v Beretta USA Corp., 821 NE.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004), applied.

(3) In this case it was relevant to the question of foreseeability that the defendant’s website was not involved in the sale or delivery of the firearms advertised on its website. Crimes by third parties who used the website to buy and sell firearms illegaly were not reasonably foreseeable. Further, requiring the defendant to alter its mode of business to prevent unlawful sales would impose an effectively business-ending burden on it.

Pavlides v Niles Gun Show, Inc., 93 Ohio App.3d 46, 637 N.E.2d 404 (Ohio App. Ct. 1994), distinguished

Judgment

The Court’s judgment is available here.

An appeal has been lodged.

 

Posted on by Stephen Tuck

Varipatis v Almario (2013) H&FLR 2014-9

Varipatis v Almario (2013) H&FLR 2014-9

Court of Appeal of New South Wales

18 April 2013

Coram: Basten, Meagher and Ward JJA.

Appearing for the Appellant: Mr D Higgs SC and Ms E Peden (instructed by TressCox Lawyers)
Appearing for the Respondent: Mr DE Graham SC and Mr NJ Broadbent (Instructed by Turner Freeman)

Catchwords: New South Wales – obesity – liver disease – cancer – medical practitoner – refusal to attempt weight loss – failure to treat patient’s obesity – negligence – bariatric surgery – reasonable care – breach of duty – state of medical knowledge

Facts: Mr Almario (plaintiff) was morbidly obese. It was common ground that his obesity resulted in a number of conditions including liver disease which progressed to cirrhosis and finally to terminal liver cancer. He was a patient of Dr Varipatis (defendant) from August 1997 to February 2011. On 27 April 1998 the appellant referred him to a Dr Yates for pulmonary problems. Dr Yates saw the appellant twice in June and July 1998 and recommended that he be referred to a specialist at the obesity unit of a major hospital. When the plaintiff consulted the defendant on 30 July 1998, he formally declined such a referral and stated that he would not attempt weight loss.

The plaintiff sued the defendant on the basis that he (the defendant) had failed to take necessary steps to treat the plaintiff’s obesity, resulting in him developing the liver conditions.

At trial the court held that the defendant had been negligent in failing to refer the plaintiff to a bariatric surgeon by 30 July 1998, in failing to refer him to an obesity clinic, and in failing to refer him to a hepatologist or similar physician by 30 September 2000. However, only the failure to refer him to a bariatric surgeon was found to be causative*.  The defendant appealed.

Held: Upholding the appeal –

Per Basten JA (Ward JA agreeing) and Meagher JA –

(1) To take reasonable care for the health of a patient, a general practitioner may be obliged to advise bluntly that weight loss is required, to discuss how this may be achieved, and to encourage them to accept suitable referrals. However, the general practitioner’s duty of care does not require an exercise in futility: if a patient declines to take the advise of his general practitioner and appropriate specialists there is no breach of duty in failing to write a further referral.

(2) On the state of medical knowledge in 1998, a reasonable general practitioner would not have referred the plaintiff to a bariatric surgeon at that time. Accordingly, Dr Varipatis had not been negligent in failing to make such a referral.

Per Basten JA (Ward JA agreeing) –

(3) On the state of medical knowledge in 2000, it was unlikely referral to a hepatologist would have resulted in any particular recommendation in relation to weight loss.

Judgment

The Court’s judgment is available here.

On 16 August 2013 the High Court of Australia declined to hear an appeal from the Court of Appeal’s decision: Almario v Varipatis [2013] HCATrans 193

=======================
* Almario v. Varipatis (No. 2) [2012] NSWSC 1578

Posted on by Stephen Tuck

S.E.F. v Archer-Daniels-Midland Co & Ors (2014) H&FLR 2014-8

S.E.F. v Archer-Daniels-Midland Co & Ors (2014) H&FLR 2014-8

United States District Court (W.D.N.Y.)

21 April 2014

Coram: Skretny CJ

Appearing for the Plaintiff: J. Michael Hayes (of Law Offices of J. Michael Hayes)
Appearing for the Defendant: Kevin Hogan (of Phillips Lytle LLP) and Dan K. Webb, Stephen V. D’Amore, Scott P. Glauberman and Cornelius M. Murphy (all of Winston & Strawn LLP)

Catchwords: New York – high-fructose corn syrup – diabetes – negligence – product liability – failure to warn – market-share liability – feasible redesign

Facts: The defendants* were manufacturers of high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS). The plaintiff was a 14 year old girl who alleged that she had consumed HFCS in common foods and that this caused her to develop Type 2 diabetes. She sought compensation from the defendants based on negligence, gross negligence, strict products liability and failure to warn of the danger of a product. She relied on the doctrine of market-share liability, whereby a defendant can be presumed liable for a plaintiff’s injury to the extent of its share of the relevant market**.

The defendants’ position was that the plaintiff could neither connect her condition to HFCS, nor to any particular defendant. It was also contended that Federal food-additive laws pre-empted her claim. The defendants applied to dismiss the claim.

Judicial notice was taken that type 2 diabetes could be caused by a number of factors including diet, exercise (or lack thereof) and family history. It was common ground that the law of the state of New York applied to the claim.

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim,

(1) The plaintiff had failed to state a plausible ground for relief and therefore the claim failed.

(2) An implausible claim ought not be allowed to proceed on the basis that may be validated or undermined through discovery.

Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 US 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v Twombly, 550 US 544 (2007), followed.
Pelman v McDonald’s Corp., 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir., 2005), not followed.

(3) New York law does not allow “market share liability” to apply in cases where the manifestation of injury is not alleged to be far removed from the time of the allegedly harmful product’s consumption. It also does not allow the doctrine to apply where there is no signature injury conclusively linking the product to the harm, and certainly not where there is no clear public policy that it should apply.

Hamilton v Beretta USA Corp., 96 NY.2d 222, 750 NE.2d 1055 (2001) and Brenner v American Cyanamid Co., 263 AD.2d 165 (4th Dept, 1999), followed.

(4) New York law recognizes claims of strict liability in relation to design defects where it can be shown that: the product as designed presented a substantial risk of harm; it was feasible to design it in a safer manner; and the design defect was a substantial factor in causing injury. However, if the necessary redesigning causes the product to cease to exist, a design defect claim must fail.

DiBartolo v Abbott Labs., 914 F. Supp. 2d 601 (S.D.N.Y., 2012) and Clinton v Brown & Williamson Holdings Inc., 498 F. Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y., 2007), followed.

Judgment

The Court’s judgment is available here.

=====================================

* Archer-Daniels-Midland Co, Cargill Inc, Ingredion Inc, Penford Products Co, Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas LLC and Roquette America Inc.
** Hymowitz v Eli Lilly & Co, 73 NY.2d 487; 539 NE.2d 1069 (1989).

Posted on by Stephen Tuck

Kingswood Golf Club Ltd v Smith and Sutton (2005) H&FLR 2014-6

Kingswood Golf Club Ltd v Smith and Sutton (2005) H&FLR 2014-6

Court of Appeal of Victoria

16 September 2005

Coram: Maxwell P, Callaway and Ashley JJA

Appearing for the Appellant: Mr DFR Beach SC and Mr Chris Winneke (instructed by Cornwall Stodart)

Appearing for the First Respondent: No appearance (1)

Appearing for the Second Respondent: Mr JP Brett (instructed by Phillips Fox, now part of DLA Piper)

Catchwords: Victoria – golf – golf cart – concealed hazard – loss of control – negligence – apportionment

Facts: The first and second respondents (respectively Smith and Sutton) were playing golf on 12 February 2002 at a course operated by the appellant (Club). While moving to the third tee, the front left tyre of a golf cart driven by Sutton went into a concealed depression in the ground which contained two solenoid boxes. In order to regain control of the cart Sutton steered hard to the right and accelerated. The cart veered to the right and collided with Smith, who was on foot. Smith suffered extensive injuries.

At first instance the matter was heard without a jury in the County Court of Victoria by Judge Wilmoth (2). Her Honour found that the depression was concealed by grass but could have been made obvious by clipping the grass. Her Honour also found that after exiting the depression Sutton had had sufficient time to brake but failed to do so. She found that both defendants had been negligent and apportioned liability 60% to the Club and 40% to Sutton. Damages were assessed at $292,216.90.

The Club appealed in relation to liability and apportionment.

Held: dismissing the appeal –

Per curiam, that it was open on the evidence for the judge to have found that the Club breached its duty of care to the plaintiff by failing to make the depression perceptible. While Sutton could have made better choices as to what to do after the wheel entered the depression, the chain of causation from the Club’s negligence had not been broken.

By Ashley JA (Maxwell P agreeing), that apportionment of fault is a question of proportion, balance, emphasis and the weighing of different considerations. The apportionment arrived at by the trial judge was within the available range of decisions.

By Callaway JA (dissenting), that Sutton’s negligence was greater than that of the Club and that liability should be apportioned 75% against her and 25% against the club.

Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd, 59 ALJR 492 (Austl., 1985), followed.

Judgment

The Court of Appeal’s judgment is available here.

======================

(1) Because liability and quantum were not in issue on appeal as between the plaintiff and at least one defendant, her interests were not affected and so no appearance was required. At trial she was represented by Mr Richard Kendall QC and Mr David O’Callaghan (instructed by Nicholas O’Bryan of Galbally & O’Bryan)

(2) Noreen Smith v Kingswood Golf Club Ltd and Joan Sutton [2004] VCC 9

Posted on by Stephen Tuck

Abel Limones Sr & Ors v School Board of Lee County (2013) H&FLR 2014-6

Abel Limones Sr & Ors v School Board of Lee County (2013) H&FLR 2014-6

Second District Court of Appeal (Florida)

6 February 2013

Coram: Silberman CJ, Casanueva and Black JJ

Appearing for the Plaintiff: Matthew Moore and David Rash (inst. Alters Law Firm)

Appearing for the Defendant: J. Matthew Belcastro and Traci T. McKee (inst. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt)

Catchwords: Florida – soccer – high school – collapse of player – automated external defibrillator – brain damage – negligence

Facts: Abel Limones Jr was a member of the East Lee County High School soccer team in a match against the team of Riverdale High School on the evening of 13 November 2008. During the game he collapsed on the field , following which he rapidly lost consciousness, stopped breathing and apparently ceased to have a pulse. Emergency services were called and cardio-pulmonary resuscitation was commenced. There was evidence that the coach of the East Lee County team called for an automated external defibrillator (AED) and that such a device was available at the ground. About 26 minutes after collapsing, Limones Jr was resuscitated by emergency services but suffered catastrophic brain damage.

The plaintiffs (Limones Jr and his parents) sought compensation based on a common law duty by the defendant to provide a reasonably safe environment and based on a failure to comply with §1006.165 of Florida Statutes 2008. The action was dismissed on the basis that there was no common law duty to provide or use an AED and that the claimed section did not establish a cause of action in negligence. The plaintiffs appealed.

Held: Dismissing the appeal –

(1) In relation to athletic activities, a school’s duty includes doing what a reasonably prudent person would do in the circumstances to (a) provide adequate instruction; (b) supply suitable equipment; (c) select and match competitors; (d) supervise; and (e) should injury occur, take appropriate steps to prevent aggravation of the injury.

(2) A school is not obliged at common law to provide medical care or rescue, including by means of an AED.

LA Fitness International LLC v Mayer, 980 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th DCA, 2008), followed.

The Court declined to decide whether §1006.165 of Florida Statutes 2008 created a private cause of action in negligence.

Judgment

The Court’s judgment is available here.  Note that an appeal will be considered in the matter by the Supreme Court of Florida.

Posted on by Stephen Tuck

Dunagan v Coleman (2014) H&FLR 2014-2

Dunagan v Coleman (2014) H&FLR 2014-2

Texas Court of Appeals (Fifth District)

7 April 2014

Coram: Moseley, FitzGerald and Evans JJ

Appearing for the Appellant (Defendant): Gregory Ave and Jay Harris (inst. Walters, Balido & Craine)

Appearing for the Respondent (Plaintiff): Niles Illich (inst. Law Office of Ben Abbott)

Catchwords: Texas – softball – negligence – inherent risk – recklessness

Facts: The parties were teammates on a slow pitch softball team and had played together many times. Prior to the first game of the season the defendant asked the plaintiff to catch a few pitches from him to assist him (the defendant) to focus his pitches. The defendant threw a rising fastball which the plaintiff failed to catch. The ball hit the plaintiff in the mouth causing significant injuries.

The plaintiff sued, alleging both negligence and gross negligence. A jury in the 134th Judicial District Court found that the defendant had been negligent and awarded significant damages.

Held: That the verdict ought be reversed. It is an inherent risk of softball that a ball will hit a participant and cause injury. The plaintiff’s injuries resulted from a risk inherent in the sport he was playing. As such, the defendant was not at fault based on ordinary negligence. A defendant will be found liable, however, if his conduct was grossly negligent, intentional (1) or reckless. Recklessness in this context would have taken the form of the defendant knowing or having reason to know that his pitch resulted in an unreasonable risk of physical harm, and that the risk of such harm was substantially greater than that which would be classed as “mere negligence”.

The Court observed that the fact that the incident occurred during a warm up rather than a game was not relevant: the inherent risks of a sport did not change depending on whether the conduct in issue occurred in practice or in competition.

(1) The court did not explore liability for harms caused by intentional conduct in cases where intentional and forceful contact is part of the sporting activity.

Judgment 

 The Court’s judgment is available here.

 

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