On the Centenary of Anzac Day

Oceans of ink and hurricanes of breath have been expended parsing the centenary of the Anzac landings in recent months.  Much of it has been platitudes about sacrifice; some of it has involved historically problematic claims of defending ‘our’ freedoms.  All of it has laboured under the ancient difficulty of extracting meaning from the terrible slaughter of the First World War.

Skeleton trench

I suggest that the reason people both at the time and now struggle to make sense of the vast human toll of the Great War is because the principle it was fought to defend seems so insubstantial.  In the end, for the British Empire at least, it was a war for the rule of law.

The United Kingdom’s stated reason for entering the war was the defence of Belgian neutrality.  In 1839 Germany signed the Treaty of London which created the Kingdom of Belgium, with that Kingdom recognised as remaining a neutral power.  It was that promise of neutrality which the German Empire intended to violate by executing the Schlieffen Plan in order to inflict a rapid defeat on France.

Treaties – promises between nations – are a form of law: ultimately they are a promise by a sovereign to behave in a particular way, in the same way that an Act of Parliament is a promise that some behaviour (like murder) will not be countenanced.  By making war on Belgium, the German Empire repudiated its sovereign promise.  Britain’s acceptance of this as a cause for war declared that it was willing to shed blood to maintain the rule of international law.  Its willingness to endure horrendous bloodshed in this cause was a firm demonstration that the rule would not be violated with impunity (1).

I think that the reason the sacrifice of the Great War seems meaningless today is that the principle that sovereignty is not unlimited is now taken for granted: the sovereign power of making war (or of “making die”) (2) that President Hussein sought to exercise with the annexation of Kuwait in 1990 prompted Security Council resolution 678 and ultimately resulted in the Persian Gulf War.  At present a long-running dispute between Nicaragua and Costa Rica over the location of their border has lead not to a call to arms or a gallant defence of the Fatherland, but to proceedings in the International Court of Justice.

It is for this reason that I find the hostility to international courts of William Safire (3) and Ted Cruz (4) to be somewhat concerning.  These courts are a sign that law is accepted to exist at an international level, and that state sovereignty ought conform itself to it – precisely the principle for which the British Empire went to war.  Courts like the International Court of Justice – slow, procedure-heavy, grindingly technical, unexciting – are the lasting monument to the courage and suffering of the British- and Mediterranean Expeditionary Forces.  I can think of few greater gifts to the people of the world.


(1) An interesting ‘what if’ is whether Britain would still have entered the war against Germany. Personally I think it would: the potential gains in the form of not allowing a single power to dominate Europe, and the promise of territorial gains for New Zealand, Australia and South Africa, would ultimately have been too great a temptation for the Empire to remain aloof.

(2) Sophie Wahnich, In Defence of the Terror (trans. D. Fernbach) (2012), at 58-59.

(3) William Safire, ‘The Purloined Treaty’, New York Times (9 April 2001) at np.

(4) Ted Cruz, ‘SCOTUS rejects authority of World Court’, Human Events (1 April 2008) at 1.

Fitness and Economics

A few interesting news stories have recently caught my eye that have made me think about the economic impacts of fitness-oriented policies.

One was a report in The Tennessean about the relocation of Beretta USA’s manufacturing to Tennessee.  Beretta’s reputation leans heavily towards sporting firearms, and this seems to dovetail with a sympathy in a number of southern American states to outdoor sports (and with an antipathy in those same states to gun control).  A pro-outdoor sports policy, then, can have benefits for investment in a region.  It can also incentivize the promotion of environmental benefits, although this may or may not support economic growth.

The construction of infrastructure like rail-trails is another source of direct investment which has the potential for corollary benefits in a healthier populace and a more productive and stable workforce.  That said, promoting these outcomes may have other (perhaps more immediate negative economic impacts: For example, advertisements about the dangers of highly-sweetened drinks (and doubts as to the merit of diet drinks) may be expected to affect manufacturers of these products in a negative way.  Further, promoting healthy foodstuffs like melons may both encourage economic activity while worsening overall labour standards.

Fitness initiatives, then, can be said to have great potential for economic benefits but must be carefully calibrated not to create extra problems.

Pennsylvania v Gosselin (2004) H&FLR 2015-33

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Barbara Gosselin (2004) H&FLR 2015-33

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

5 November 2004

Coram: Hudock and Klein JJ; McEwen PJE

Appearing for the Prosecution: No appearance
Appearing for the Defendant: Dick Berger

Catchwords: Pennsylvania – pets – squirrel – wildlife – marking

Facts: The defendant was a resident of South Carolina in the early 1990s.  While a resident there she took into her care an injured squirrel which became the family pet.  In 1994 the defendant, her husband and the squirrel relocated to Pennsylvania, where the squirrel was housed in a room-sized enclosure.  In 2002 an officer of the Pennsylvania Game Commission became aware of this and requested that the squirrel be released into his charge on the basis that it was unlawful to keep it in this manner.  The defendant declined to release the squirrel and was charged with unlawfully possessing wildlife.

Section 2307 of the Pennsylvania Game and Wildlife Code (34 Pa CSA §2307) relevantly provides that –

(a) It is unlawful for any person to … possess … any … wildlife contrary to the provisions of this title.

(c) Nothing in this title shall prohibit the possession … of … wild animals lawfully taken outside of [Pennsylvania] which are tagged and marked in accordance with the laws of the state or nation where the … wild animals were taken. It is unlawful to … possess … wild animals from another state or nation which have been unlawfully taken, killed or exported.

It was common ground that the squirrel was a wild animal and that South Carolina law allowed the taking and domestication of squirrels without requiring them to be tagged or marked.

The defendant was convicted of the charge and fined $100.00: Pennsylvania v Gosselin, Morning Call, 14 May 2003 (Orwigsburg Dist. Ct., Feb. 2003).  She appealed to the Court of Common Pleas which upheld the conviction: Pennsylvania v Gosselin, Morning Call, 28 November 2003 (Schuykill Co. Ct. Comm. Pleas, Nov. 2003).  She further appealed to the Superior Court.

Held: Allowing the appeal and dismissing the charge, that because South Carolina law did not require the squirrel to be tagged or marked, the absence of tagging or marking met the requirements of §2307(c).  Because it was agreed that the squirrel was lawfully taken in South Carolina, the exception in paragraph (c) was made out.


The Court’s judgment is available here.