What cheerleaders say on Twitter

Social media has become a pit for the unwary.  Pretty well every comment or ‘like’ you hand out has the potential to come back and bite you, either in your career or in the form of a headline.  Or in the case of a cheerleader, in a captaincy.

San Benito High School in Texas seems to have a strong and successful cheer team.  In early 2017 a young lady identified as “ML” was appointed as head varsity cheerleader.  A few weeks later, she was called to a meeting with the team coaches where she was stripped of her post and dropped from the team.  The coaches had found her Twitter feed, which they considered to have been “inappropriate”.  In particular, they were alarmed that she had liked posts created by others saying –

  • “Imma show my mom all the snaps2 from girls partying for spring break so she can appreciate her lame ass daughter some more,”
  • a tweet about braiding hair containing the acronym “lmao,”
  • a tweet containing an image of a text-message conversation between a mother and a daughter, in which the word “fuck” is used twice
  • “I love kissing lmao,”
  • “i [sic] don’t fuck with people who lowkey try to compete with/ out do me,”
  • “I fucking love texas [sic] man, it’s so beautiful and just overall great! Why would anyone want to leave Texas[?],”
  • “I love her [third-party Twitter user] I FUCKING LOVE YOU SO MUCH AND YOU DONT [sic] EVEN KNOW IT LIKE BITCH I HOPE YOU DO GREAT SHIT IN LIFE I BELIEVE IN YOU,”
  • a tweet from a Twitter account entitled “Horny Facts™,” which states, “bitch don’t touch my . . .”4

In addition, she had retweeted a post from “Bitch Code” and replied in the affirmative to the question “Did pope split you in half??”

The plaintiff, by her mother, brought proceedings alleging a violation of her free speech rights.  Statute 42 USC §1983 relevantly states that –

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State … subjects … any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ….

The claim was dismissed at first instance on the grounds that the defendants were entitled to a qualified immunity.  The plaintiff appealed to the 5th US Circuit Court of Appeals.

San Benito HS
Image from here

The Court noted that a defendant will be entitled to qualified immunity where their action “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”.  Immunity will be made out where there has been insufficient case law to warn a defendant that their acts violate the Bill of Rights.

The Court then proceeded to review the available case law on the free-speech rights of school pupils.  It concluded that at the time of ML’s dismissal, the case law on out-of-school speech had not established clear boundaries.  The Court took the opportunity to sum up the available case law in the hope of offering guidance to school administrators –

First, nothing in our precedent allows a school to discipline nonthreatening off-campus speech simply because an administrator considers it “offensive, harassing, or disruptive.” …. Second, it is “indisputable” that non-threatening student expression is entitled to First Amendment protection, even though the extent of that protection may be “diminished” if the speech is “composed by a student on-campus, or purposefully brought onto a school campus.” …. And finally, as a general rule, speech that the speaker does not intend to reach the school community remains outside the reach of school officials. ….  Because a school’s authority to discipline student speech derives from the unique needs and goals of the school setting, a student must direct her speech towards the school community in order to trigger schoolbased discipline.

The court declined to say whether the case at hand actually had breached these principles.  It concluded that “there was no clearly-established law that placed M.L.’s rights beyond debate at the time of” her dismissal.  As such, the claim of immunity was made out.  The appeal was dismissed.

Longoria v San Benito Independent Consolidated School District (US Ct of App. 5th Cir., King, Higginson and Duncan JJ, 4 November 2019, unreported)

Ind. School Dist. No. I-89, Okla. Co v Okla. Sec. School Activities Ass’n (2014) H&FLR 2015-7

Independent School District No. I-89 of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma v Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Association (2014) H&FLR 2015-7

District Court of Oklahoma County (Oklahoma)

11 December 2014

Coram: Jones J

Appearing for the Plaintiff: F. Andrew Fugitt and Anthony T. Childers
Appearing for the Defendant: Mark S. Grossman, Andre B. Caldwell and Meredith W. Wolfe (of Crowe & Dunlevy)

Catchwords: Oklahoma – high school – American football – umpiring – review of decisions – sporting associations – injunction.

Facts: A high school football team operated by the plaintiff took part in a playoff game overseen by the defendant on 28 November 2014. The plaintiff considered that its team had been disadvantaged by a particular umpiring decision and sought a replay of the game, which the defendant refused.  The plaintiff sought an injunction compelling the replaying of the last 64 seconds of the game or (alternatively) the replaying of the entire match.

Held: refusing to grant the injunction, that –

1. To obtain a temporary injunction a plaintiff must show (a) a substantial likelihood of success in the substantive issue; (b) irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is refused; (c) that the potential injury is not speculative and outweighs the harm of the temporary injunction to the respondent; and (d) that the injunction would not be contrary to the public interest.

Tulsa Order of Police Lodge No. 93 v City of Tulsa, 39 P.3d 152 (2001) and House of Realty v City of Midwest City, 109 P.3d 314 (2004), followed.

2. The necessary harm could not be shown simply by the defendant’s alleged breach of its own policies, particularly where the policies themselves and their application was a matter of the defendant’s discretion.

3. In general, courts should not intervene in matters where the parties have agreed to be bound by and submitted to the governance of activities associations.

4. The court would in any case decline to order the requested relief because there is no means of ensuring that it may be carried out fairly: it would be impossible to replicate entirely the conditions of the disputed match with regard to player fatigue, weather, field conditions, coaching and referee decisions, among other things, and an attempt to do so would invite uncertainty and error. Ultimately this would frustrate athletic pursuits themselves.

Judgment

The Court’s judgement is available here.

Michelle Rios v Grossmont Union High School District (2013) H&FLR 2014-15

Michelle Rios & Ors v Grossmont Union High School District (2013) H&FLR 2014-15

Fourth District Court of Appeal for California

16 December 2013

Coram: McConnell PJ, Irion and O’Rourke JJ.

Appearing for the Appellant: Mark C. Choate (of Choate Law Firm) and Jon R. Williams (of Boudreau Williams LLP)

Appearing for the Respondent: Daniel R. Shinoff and Paul Vincent Carelli (both of Stutz Atiano Shinoff & Holtz APC)

Catchwords: California – high school – football – ankle injury – returned to play – tackle – spinal injury – negligence – standard of care – jury instructions –  appeal

Facts: Michelle and Reymond Rios were the parents of Colter Rios, who suffered a spinal injury while playing for a high school football team organised by the defendant.  He sustained an ankle injury during play and, after having the ankle strapped by a college student who was studying athletic training (rather than the school’s athletic trainer himself), was returned to the field.  After rejoining play, he was tackled by an opposing player and suffered significant injuries.

Master Rios and his parents brought proceedings against the defendant school district.  They alleged that the District had negligently allowed him to continue to play following his ankle injury.  The parties agreed that the ordinary standard of care applied, with the further detail that adults must anticipate the ordinary behaviour of children and be more careful in dealing with children than in dealing with other adults.  The jury was permitted to consider the community’s customs or practices in assessing what a reasonable person would have done in the circumstances.  It was also agreed by the plaintiffs that the standard of care to be observed by school staff is that which a person of ordinary prudence and having comparable duties would exercise under the same circumstances.  They did not ask that the jury be given any particular instructions based on the standards of the National Athletic Trainers’ Association standards or of the California Interscholastic Federation.

The jury returned a finding of no negligence.  The plaintiffs appealed.

Held: Per curiam, dismissing the appeal –

1.            The court at first instance had correctly instructed the jury as to the law: in a claim for injuries suffered in a high school football game, the standard of care required of a school official is that which a person of ordinary prudence, with the same responsibilities and in the same circumstances, would exercise.

Pirkle v Oakdale Union Grammar School District, 253 P.2d 1, 40 Cal.2d 207 (1953), followed.

2.            When the relevant law has been stated correctly in a general charge to the jury, a party may not argue on appeal that a more specific instruction should have been given, unless they at the time requested a more specific instruction be given.

White v Inbound Aviation, 69 Cal.App.4th 910, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 71 (1999), followed.

No finding was made on whether more specific instructions should actually have been given to the jury.

Judgment

The court’s judgment is available here.  The Supreme Court of California declined to consider an appeal.