Litigation in the time of Covid

The outbreak of Covid-19 and the proclamation of a pandemic has been making most human activities challenging.  Litigation is no different: at present I’m looking at an array of hearing dates being pushed off into the ether for want of a jury.

For better or worse, the Courts can order matters to proceed as judge-alone trials rather than jury trials.  A short decision from the Supreme Court of Victoria gives some idea what factors will be considered in the time of Covid.

In the matter in issue the plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused at a Victorian school.  Proceedings were issued in the Supreme Court of Victoria and both parties requested that it be heard by a jury.  The plaintiff subsequently asked for the matter to be heard without a jury, which the defendant opposed.

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Photo by cottonbro on Pexels.com

Macaulay J noted that –

It is not currently known how long the suspension of jury trials will last. Doing the best I can, I think the projection is likely to be of the order of many weeks not just days. It could be a number of months.

He also noted that the effect of this would be to cause significant delays and extra strain on the Court system.  While the Court had a discretion to dispense with a jury in the interests of justice, a jury would generally decide the matter if a party so requested.  His Honour also observed that the Civil Procedure Act 2010 obliged him to promote the just, efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of the issues in dispute.

The factors Macaulay J particularly considered relevant to the justice of the case were –

  1. The nature of the plaintiff’s injuries and the impact of the litigation process on him
  2. The “unprecedented nature of the current coronavirus crisis means that it is totally uncertain when this case could be heard again before a jury”
  3. What the case would be heard again it would be competing for a hearing date with many other matters.
  4. There was no factor in the case which would make a judge-alone trial unjust.
  5. The delay and the uncertainty as to a new hearing date stood to cause “real injustice to the plaintiff”.
  6. There was a public interest in cases being dealt with in an orderly, timely and cost-effective way.  This contended against deferring cases in a situation of uncertainty

The Court decided that the matter should proceed without a jury.

Mulquiney v Reynolds [2020] VSC 119

Bell v Nichols and Inman (2014) H&FLR 2014-25

Alexias Bell v Kurt Nichols and Thomas Inman (2014) H&FLR 2014-25

Tenth Texas Court of Appeals

24 April 2014

Coram: Gray CJ, Davis and Scoggins JJ

Appearing for the Appellant: Renee E. Moeller and Susan Allison Kidwell
Appearing for the First Respondent: David Bradley and Trisha Danielle Ross (both of Walters, Balido & Crain)
Appearing for the Second Respondent: Russell Chip Pelley (of Pelley Law Office) and Joe Neal Smith  

Catchwords: Texas – college football – mascot – motorcycle – punch – civil procedure – admissions – want of prosecution

Facts: Bell (appellant) was employed by Sam Houston State University to attend a football game as a mascot*.  She was being driven to a pre-game function on the front of a four-wheel motorcycle driven by Inman (second respondent).  The second respondent allegedly ran into Nichols (first respondent), the coach of the opposing team, who punched the appellant and caused her to fall off the motorcycle.  She brought proceedings against the second respondent for negligence and against the first respondent for negligence, gross negligence, assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The appellant’s lawyer withdrew during the proceedings and for a period of time she was unrepresented.  During this time the first respondent sent requests for admissions to the appellant.  Four of the proposed admissions were to the effect that the respondents neither harmed her nor were the proximate cause of harm to her, had not caused intentional harm to her, and acted reasonably and prudently.  She objected to these admissions and the respondents applied to the court to deem the requests admitted.

After an abortive hearing on 28 December 2012 the matter was refixed for consideration on 26 March 2013, by which time the appellant had secured new representation.  Her new lawyer amended her response to the request for admissions to deny those to which she had previously objected.  The trial court granted the respondents’ motion to deem the admissions sought and dismissed the proceedings for want of prosecution.  The appellant appealed.

Held: Allowing the appeal –

1.  A court at first instance may dismiss a case for what of prosecution based on a defendant’s motion.  If the dismissal is appealed, and the dismissal order does not state the grounds on which it was dismissed, the appellant must show that each of the grounds alleged in the motion to dismiss is insufficient to support the decision to dismiss.  Here, the motion to dismiss was based solely on the appellant’s failure to appear at the (non-)hearing on 28 December 2012 and was an abuse of discretion.

Nichols v Sedalco Construction Services, 228 SW.3d 341 (Tex. App. – Waco 2007), followed.

2.  Where a party objects to an admission, Rule 215 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to consider whether the objection is justified.  If not, it shall order that an answer be served.  It is not able to deem a matter admitted because of an improper objection.

Judgment

The Court’s judgment is available here.

An appeal appears to have been lodged.

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* Known as “Airkat“.